We show that sentiments - self-fulfilling changes in beliefs that are orthogonal to fundamentals - can drive persistent aggregate fluctuations under rational expectations. Such fluctuations can occur even in the absence of any exogenous aggregate fundamental shocks. In addition, sentiments also...

We characterize the entire set of linear equilibria of beauty contest games under general information structures. In particular, we focus on equilibria in which sentiments, that is self-fulfilling changes in beliefs that are orthogonal to fundamentals and exogenous noise, can drive aggregate...

We show that sentiments - self-fulfilling changes in beliefs that are orthogonal to fundamentals - can drive persistent aggregate fluctuations under rational expectations in a beauty contest game. Such fluctuations can occur even in the absence of exogenous aggregate fundamental shocks....

We consider a class of convex, competitive, neoclassical economies in which agents are rational; the equilibrium is unique; there is no room for randomization devices; and there are no shocks to preferences, technologies, endowments, or other fundamentals. In short, we rule out every known source...

We consider a class of convex, competitive, neoclassical economies in which agents are rational; the equilibrium is unique; there is no room for randomization devices; and there are no shocks to preferences, technologies, endowments, or other fundamentals. In short, we rule out every known source...