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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489248
We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011620518
We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure strategy subsets is epistemically robust if there is a Cartesian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011585170
We propose an extension of the class of rational expectations bubbles (REBs) to the more general rational beliefs setting of Kurz (1994a,b). In a potentially non-stationary but stationarizable environment, it is possible to hold more than one (small-r) “rational” expectation. When rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919580
We analyze the diffusion of rival information in a social network. In our model, rational agents can share information sequentially, unconstrained by an exogenous protocol or timing. We show how to compute the set of eventually informed agents for any network, and show that it is essentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212083
systems, in which there is common knowledge of rationality and a common prior. We show here that common knowledge of … rationality is not needed: when rationality is satisfied in the support of an action-consistent distribution (a concept introduced … rational belief systems’ there may not be mutual knowledge of rationality, let alone common knowledge of rationality. In the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730386
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010460319
The paper studies an evolutionary model where players from a given population are randomly matched in pairs each period to play a coordination game. At each instant, a player can choose to adopt one of the two possible behavior rules, called the rational rule and the aspiring rule, and then take...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222645
We propose an incomplete information analogue of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process. At each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some conjecture that puts weight...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014123747
notion of rationality, based on this new theory of mind …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112730