The change in elected officials’ behavior when an election nears has typically been attributed to incentive effects. I document that behavioral changes can occur even for unelected judges. Using data from 1925-2002 on U.S. appellate judges, who are appointed for life, I find that just before...

Politicians’ behavioral changes as an election nears have typically been attributed to the incentive effects of an election. I document that behavioral changes can occur even for unelected judges. Using data from 1925-2002 on U.S. appellate judges, who are appointed for life, I find that just...

Federal courts are a mainstay of the justice system in the United States. In this study, we analyze 387,898 cases from U.S. Courts of Appeals, where judges are randomly assigned to panels of three. We predict which judge dissents against co-panelists and analyze the dominant features that...

Politicians' behavioral changes as an election nears have typically been attributed to the incentive effects of an election. I document that behavioral changes can occur even for unelected judges.Using data from 1925-2002 on U.S. appellate judges, who are appointed for life, I find that just...

We find field evidence consistent with experimental studies that document the contexts and characteristics making individuals more susceptible to priming. Just before U.S. Presidential elections, judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals double the rate at which they dissent and vote along partisan...