It is widely believed that deterrence constitutes the most important impact of competition policy, but this seems to be largely a matter faith rather than based on any empirical evidence. This paper present a rare attempt to quantify the deterrence effect of cartel policy. It develops a...

It is widely believed that deterrence constitutes the most important impact of competition policy, but this seems to be largely a matter faith rather than based on any empirical evidence. This paper present a rare attempt to quantify the deterrence effect of cartel policy. It develops a...

This paper investigates the deterrent impact of competition enforcement on cartels. It is shown theoretically that if enforcement is effective in deterring and constraining cartels then there will be fewer cartels with low overcharges and fewer with high overcharges. This prediction provides an...

This paper finds evidence of an inverse U shape in the number of cartels detected by a Competition Agency (CA) over its lifetime. We interpret this as evidence that, as the CA builds up experience in enforcement, this feeds back into the business community to deter future cartel formation. We...