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Competition law has proliferated around the world. Due to data limitations, however, there is little systematic information about the substance and enforcement of these laws. In this paper, we address that problem by introducing two new datasets on competition law regimes around the world....
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Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891136
Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anticompetitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014107910
Most scholars believe that courts should enforce government contracts, though they disagree about the extent to which liability or damages rules should trade off relevant considerations - the problem of governments holding up contractors, on the one hand, and the problem of governments using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126180
Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges...
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Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013361981