We study the relationship between the enforceability of covenants not to compete (CNCs) and employee mobility and wages. We exploit a 2015 CNC ban for technology workers in Hawaii and find that this ban increased mobility by 11% and new-hire wages by 4%. We supplement the Hawaii evaluation with...

Do contracts influence behavior independent of the law governing their enforceability? We explore this question in the context of employment noncompetes, using nationally representative data for 11,500 labor force participants. We show that noncompetes are associated with reductions in employee...

This paper assesses the content, role, and adaptability of subjective beliefs about contract enforceability in the context of postemployment covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”). We show that employees of all stripes tend to believe that their noncompetes are enforceable, even when they...

This study examines the effect of noncompete enforceability on training and wages. An increase from non-enforcement to mean enforceability is associated with a 14% increase in training, which tends to be firm-sponsored and designed to upgrade or teach new skills. In contrast to theoretical...

We study whether firms value court enforceability of their workers’ noncompete agreements (NCAs), leveraging a 2020 Washington law that made NCAs unenforceable for workers earning less than a threshold of $100k per year (indexed to inflation), covering approximately 79% of Washing-ton workers....