This paper explores how to optimally set tax and transfers when taxation authorities : (1) are uninformed about individuals’ value of time in both market and non-market activities and (2) can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment. In contrast to much of the optimal...

This paper explores how to optimally set tax and transfers when taxation authorities : (1) are uninformed about individuals’ value of time in both market and non-market activities and (2) can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment. In contrast to much of the optimal...

This paper explores how to optimally set tax and transfers when taxation authorities : (1) are uninformed about individuals’ value of time in both market and non-market activities and (2) can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment. We show that optimal...

This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1)" are uninformed about individuals' value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. " Formally, the problem...

This paper characterizes an optimal redistribution program when taxation authorities: (1)" are uninformed about individuals' value of time in both market and non-market activities observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment, and (3) are utilitarian. " Formally, the problem...