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This article presents a survey of how optimal income taxation is influenced by labour market considerations. We begin with the standard supply-side optimal income tax model of Mirrlees, and outline the various extensions to that model. We then consider how optimal taxation is affected by various...
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Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these three cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to those most in need. Enabling the government to monitor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940611
This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Income Distribution (edited by A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon), reviews some of the central issues that arise in thinking about the motives for, politics of, constraints on and measurement of, redistribution. Amongst the themes are: the potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940612
This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940629
We study the features of optimal transfers to the non-employed which include those unable to work, the voluntarily unemployed, and the involuntarily unemployed. Both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous. We analyze optimal government policies in the presence of two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572502
This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005688264
Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these three cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to those most in need. Enabling the government to monitor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005787822