In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access...

We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her (pollution) emissions. With constant marginal damages...

We analyze the production of electricity from n power stations situated along a river in a dynamic model. Each power station's production of electricity is constrained by the quantity of water available to it (capacity constraint) as well as limitations of reservoir capacity (storage...

This note shows that, by reducing agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation while at the same time increasing firms'private benefit.

We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her (pollution) emissions. With constant marginal damages...