Exploiting cross-sectional and time-series variations in European regulations during the July 2008–June 2009 period, we show that: (1) prohibition on covered short selling raises bid-ask spread and reduces trading volume, (2) prohibition on naked short selling raises both volatility and...

Exploiting cross-sectional and time-series variations in European regulations during the July 2008 – June 2009 period, we show that: 1) Prohibition on covered short selling raises bid-ask spread and reduces trading volume, 2) Prohibition on naked short selling raises both volatility and...

Regulatory loan ceilings are commonly found in the prosocial lending sector, yet they can have unintended perverse effects. By mitigating the risk of adverse selection, loan caps catalyze co-financing arrangements between subsidized lenders and commercial banks. These arrangements can, in turn,...

Exploiting cross-sectional and time-series variations in European regulations during the July 2008 – June 2009 period, we show that: Prohibition on covered short selling raises bid-ask spread and reduces trading volume, prohibition on naked short selling raises both volatility and bid-ask...

In the Basel regulation the required capital of a financial institution is based on conditional measures of the risk of its future equity value such as Value-at-Risk, or Expected Shortfall. In Basel 2 the uncertainty on this equity value is captured by means of changes in asset prices (market...