This paper studies competition in regulation and commodity taxation between trading countries. We present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no...

This paper studies competition in commodity taxation and product market regula- tion between trading partner countries. We present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods, and prod- uct market regulation affects both the number of...

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build–operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and firm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries...

This paper studies the effect of soft-budget constraints in a pure adverse selection model of monopoly regulation. We consider a government maximizing total surplus but incurring some cost of public funds à la Laffont Tirole (1993). We propose a regulatory set-up in which firms are free to...