This paper presents a dynamic model of a bank's optimal choices of imposing a binding liquidity-coverage-ratio (LCR) constraint. Our baseline balance-sheet dynamics starts with portfolio separation and no LCR constraint. Under a scenario in which regulators prohibit banks from applying...

This policy brief examines issues associated with the design and implementation of regulatory policymaking in interconnected financial markets. The policy brief explains why international interdependence among nations' financial markets and regulations can provide an incentive for national...

Since passage of the Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the government has been explicitly and implicitly regulating the compensation of top managers at a number of U.S. banks. In addition, bank regulators have added evaluations of bank management compensation packages to the list of factors...

We propose a theory of 'regulatory endogenous sunk costs' (RESC), in which a captured regulator raises minimum quality standards when market size increases in order to protect incumbent firms. Our RESC theory's predictions that market size is unrelated to industry concentration and positively...

This paper evaluates the effects of binding regulatory restraints on the rate of performance-based management compensation within a banking framework in which the primary function of bank management teams is to monitor loans in order to eliminate deadweight default losses. Available management...