This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and infrastructure policy reforms.  I construct a simple model to illustrate how both an incerase in regulatory autonomy and privatisation may influence the effect of corruption.  This interaction is then analysed empirically using a...

This paper builds a dynamic model of utility regulation where a government cannot commit to a time-inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment. By allowing the government’s type to change over time, I explore how reputation concerns may generate partial commitment. Restricting...

The efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction. However, recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success. Evidence suggests that, in many instances, this was because the...

This chapter is a first attempt to systematically characterize and describe the role of international actors in promoting anti-corruption policy in regulation and procurement. Drawing upon a variety of economic theories of corruption in these sectors, I analyze how international actors may play...

As regions around the world are considering increased integration of key energy, transport or other infrastructure networks, issues build in the design of the supranational national regulation needed in that context are increasingly well recognized. Solutions are however slow to emerge. This...