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On the social function and the regulation of liability insurance

Shavell, Steven - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001459739

A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation

Shavell, Steven - In: The Rand journal of economics 15 (1984) 2, pp. 271-280

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001013169

Liability for harm versus regulation of safety

Shavell, Steven - 1983

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002797146

A model of the socially optimal use of liability and regulation

Shavell, Steven - 1983

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002797194

A fundamental enforcement cost advantage of the negligence rule over regulation

Shavell, Steven - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625182

A fundamental enforcement cost advantage of the negligence rule over regulation

Shavell, Steven - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009633263

Do excessive legal standards discourage desirable activity?

Shavell, Steven - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003292432

Do excessive legal standards discourage desirable activity?

Shavell, Steven - In: Economics letters 95 (2007) 3, pp. 394-397

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003476313

A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation

Shavell, Steven - 1983

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002797177

A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule Over Regulation

Shavell, Steven - 2012

Regulation and the negligence rule are both designed to obtain compliance with desired standards of behavior, but they differ in a primary respect: compliance with regulation is ordinarily assessed independently of the occurrence of harm, whereas compliance with the negligence rule is evaluated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100136