In the transition from state-owned monopolies to privately led and increasingly competitive market structures in telecommunications, poor performance of regulatory agencies limits the benefits of reform. This Note proposes measures for establishing a regulatory framework that enables better...

In a companion note (Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best?), we argued that while the full liberalization of telecommunications markets provides scope for relying to a large extent on general antitrust rules and institutions as instruments of economic regulation,...

Among the countries fully liberalizing their telecommunicationssector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules,often applied by sector-specific institutions, while others havedepended on economywide antitrust rules and institutions to controlmarket power. This Note describes the...

Full liberalization of telecommunications markets provides scope for relying largely on general antitrust rules and institutions for economic regulation. But at least for a time after liberalization, sector-specific rules and institutions are likely to be needed in some areas, including...

Countries with fully liberalized telecommunications markets have adopted different mixes of antitrust and sector-specific regulatory instruments. Does the balance between the two approaches matter for competitiveness? Drawing on the experiences of Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the United...