To maximize their profit, multinationals can design and implement the same and toughest standard in all locations, regardless of domestic regulations. We discuss this kind of overcompliance and stress its underpinnings. Some potential extensions are suggested. Copyright Springer Japan 2005

To maximize their profit, multinationals can design and implement the same and toughest standard in all locations, regardless of domestic regulations. We discuss this kind of overcompliance and stress its underpinnings. Some potential extensions are suggested

Environmental economics has employed the seminal contribution of Ronald H. Coase (1960) intensively but has remained relatively unaffected by the contributions of perhaps his most influential follower, Oliver E. Williamson. As an initial step in addressing this oversight, we apply the analytical...

The first generation of ethical activism has led policymakers to impose higher ethical standards on domestic industries. Because of the costs generated by these ethical pressures, firms may delocate their productive activities to 'unethical havens'. The second generation of ethical activism has...

Williamson's systematic treatment of transaction costs in explaining governance structures has rarely been applied to the field of environmental economics. The aim of this chapter is to address this oversight by analysing how transaction cost economics can help choose among environmental policy...