We develop a tractable general equilibrium model to analyze credit risk sharing via credit default swaps (CDS) and CDS market regulation under aggregate uncertainty. If available equity capital is below a threshold, any equilibrium of the basic economy with no CDS markets features firm default...

We analyze the design and impact of bank regulation using a dynamic structural framework. The optimal regulatory policy combines a target capital requirement, the mitigation of underinvestment, an intervention capital requirement to control inefficient risk-taking, and recapitalization of...

We develop a general equilibrium model of competitive insurance and equity capital markets to show how aggregate asset and insurance liability risks affect insurance prices and regulation. In the unique equilibrium of the benchmark unregulated economy, insurers raise external capital solely by...

We develop a theory of how agency conflicts between the shareholders and debt holders of a financial institution, accounting measurement rules, and prudential capital regulation interact to affect the institution's capital structure and project choices. We show that, relative to a benchmark...