We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and...

There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most recent turmoil in the domestic and global markets is due to a failure in our regulatory system. Yet, Congress has not supported comprehensive regulation related to the day-to-day activities of mortgage brokers and their relationship...

The SEC regulates and standardizes information production in financial markets through financial reporting standards. With a novel dataset exploiting institutional features of the standard setting process. On average, standards increase aggregate market value by 0.93%, although discord among...

I present a model in which the bank simultaneously borrows from the households and lends to a firm. The bank can monitor the firms cash flow but the households cannot. To truthfully report the cash flows to the households, the bank needs to be exposed to runs. However, the bank underinvests in...

This paper models the strategic interaction between a rating agency, a bank and a bank regulator who lacks information about bank asset risk. The regulator can either (1) make bank capital requirements contingent on credit ratings; or (2) set rating-independent capital requirements. Truthful...

We examine insurance against loan default when lenders can screen in primary markets at a heterogeneous cost and learn loan quality over time. In equilibrium, low-cost lenders screen loans, but some high-cost lenders insure them. Insured loans are risk-free and liquid in a secondary market,...

We address a three-period model of fi nancial intermediaries that involves securitization of risky loan assets, leverage, and asymmetric information. We show that the risk retention requirement with a fi xed ratio, stipulated by the Dodd-Frank Act, might induce losses of social welfare in the...

I develop a structural model of mortgage demand and lender competition to study how leverage regulation affects the equilibrium in the UK mortgage market. Using variation in risk-weighted capital requirements across lenders and across mortgages with differential loan-to-values, I show that a...

The incidence of mis-selling, fraud, and poor customer service by retail banks is significantly higher in areas with higher proportions of poor and minority borrowers and in areas where government regulation promotes an increased quantity of lending. Specifically, low-to-moderate-income (LMI)...

This paper considers effects of price regulation in retail payment systems by applying the model of telecommunications competition by Laffont-Rey-Tirole (1998). In our two-country model world there is one retail payment network located in each country and markets are segmented à la Hotelling....