In a companion note (Antitrust vs. Sector-specific Regulation in Telecom: What Works Best?), we argued that while the full liberalization of telecommunications markets provides scope for relying to a large extent on general antitrust rules and institutions as instruments of economic regulation,...

Among the countries fully liberalizing their telecommunicationssector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules,often applied by sector-specific institutions, while others havedepended on economywide antitrust rules and institutions to controlmarket power. This Note describes the...

Full liberalization of telecommunications markets provides scope for relying largely on general antitrust rules and institutions for economic regulation. But at least for a time after liberalization, sector-specific rules and institutions are likely to be needed in some areas, including...

Countries with fully liberalized telecommunications markets have adopted different mixes of antitrust and sector-specific regulatory instruments. Does the balance between the two approaches matter for competitiveness? Drawing on the experiences of Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the United...

Under concession arrangements, the state delegates to the private sector the right to provide a service, yet retains some control over the sector by incorporating in a concession contract or license the terms and conditions that will govern the infrastructure project or company. This approach is...

This paper seeks to shed some light both on how economy-wide and infrastructure or sector-specific components of the regulatory framework should be designed and on what the respective roles of such components should be to maximize the efficiency of economic regulation in telecommunications. It...