This chapter is concerned with the relations between public and private regulation in respect of hedge funds, which in their own ways govern and re-shape markets, making moral, fairness and efficiency claims and drawing in regulatory resources where they can. Three hedge fund strategies are...

It is widely agreed that failures of financial market regulation contributed to systemic instability and the credit crunch of 2007-9. However the reasons for such failures are matters of debate. Three levels of analysis are explored here: descriptive, explanatory and historical. First, and at a...

This chapter calls for democratic accountability and steering of financial market regulation, supporting national/regional diversity in regulatory institutions, frameworks and rules. It argues that the form taken by the systemic market crisis of 2006 onwards – contagion between market sectors...

Many observers blame regulatory failure for the financial crisis, arguing for closer international coordination of national regulation. This column argues for the opposite. Regulatory convergence creates instability. Instead, regulatory diversity is needed to reduce market herding and the...

This response to the 2009 UK White Paper on ‘Reforming Financial Markets' argues for stronger democratic oversight of regulators and for regulatory diversity in order to reduce ‘market herding' and the consequent systemic risks. In the context of hitherto weak democratic accountability and...

This response to the consultation on a response to the HM Treasury's 2011 consultation paper, ‘A New Approach to Financial Regulation' comes from Nicholas Dorn, an academic (see annex). The focus of the response is on accountability to Parliament of all aspects of prudential (systemic)...

The unfolding market crisis reveals evasions of regulatory controls and frauds that were less visible in buoyant markets. International networking of regulators and those they regulated resulted in convergence of regulatory standards-and creation of common ‘blind spots'-corresponding to...

Regulatory convergence — within the E.U., across the Atlantic and internationally — is conventionally represented as not only benign but also as essential in crisis prevention. This paper articulates a different frame of reference: one in which regulators “crowd,” “herd” and...

Dorn's chapter addresses three, inter-related public goods: systemic stability of financial markets, diversity in regulatory regimes, and democratic steering. Politicisation and democratic control of financial market policies and regulation – introducing a greater diversity of objectives and...