Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre‐empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...

"This paper examines capital market effects of changes in securities regulation. We analyze two key capital market directives in the European Union (EU) that tightened market abuse and transparency regulation and, in particular, their enforcement. All EU member states were required to adopt...

This paper examines how a regulatory design with multiple supervisory agencies translates into firm-level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. We exploit the fact that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and banking...

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent...

In this appendix, we provide the following for each of the 26 sample countries in Hail, Tahoun, and Wang (2018), Corporate Scandals and Regulation, Journal of Accounting Research 56(2): 617–671: a brief overview of the country's historical background and the major developments affecting the...

We examine how the presence of multiple supervisory agencies affects firm-level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. This analysis is important because coordination problems among regulators are frequently present in practice but often overlooked in academic research. We...