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Announced vs. surprise inspections with tipping-off

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Samuel, Andrew - In: European journal of political economy 34 (2014), pp. 167-183

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486594

Preemptive bribery and incomplete information : does prior knowledge matter?

Mishra, Ajit; Samuel, Andrew - In: Journal of public economic theory 19 (2017) 3, pp. 658-673

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011722057

Optimal fines under announced and surprise inspections

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Samuel, Andrew - In: Journal of public economic theory 18 (2016) 5, pp. 786-801

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011712346

A note on licenses in the presence of corruption

Farmer, Amy; Méndez, Fabio; Samuel, Andrew - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 14 (2018) 3, pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011964228

Optimal Fines Under Announced and Surprise Inspections

Dechenaux, Emmanuel - 2016

This paper examines optimal fines in a regulatory framework where the regulator can choose either surprise or announced inspections to monitor a firm for compliance. The firm can invest in detection avoidance, but it receives a fine if the regulator discovers that it is non-compliant. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997985