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Haggling for rents, relational contracts, and the theory of the firm

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

optimal. In the infinitely-repeated version of the model, it is also possible for the parties to enter a relational contract …, under which each promises not to engage in rent-seeking. Such a contract must be self-enforcing, for it cannot be enforced … by court. It is shown that integration makes the relational contract less easily sustainable, as, due to its cost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383041

Contractual incentive provision and commitment in rent-seeking contests

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343953

Inefficient R&D in public procurement : negative consequences of a separation between award and actual contract

Bös, Dieter - 1999

In public procur ement a temporal separation between award and actual contract allows private entrepreneurs who did not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781703

The cost of appropriation and firm boundaries

Mori, Yusuke - In: Economics letters 241 (2024), pp. 1-3

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015078131

Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459

On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; … - 2013

We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771751

Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts

Münster, Johannes - 2004

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: This paper models the trade-off between production and appropriation in the presence of simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts. The model exhibits a ' group cohesion effect ': if the contest between the groups...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361994

War with outsiders makes peace inside

Münster, Johannes; Staal, Klaas - 2005

In many situations there is a potential for conflict both within and between groups. Examples include wars and civil wars and distributional conflict in multitiered organizations like federal states or big companies. This paper models such situations with a logistic technology of conflict. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343958

A model of dynamic conflict in ethnocracies

Bakshi, Dripto; Dasgupta, Indraneel - 2015

We model an infinitely repeated Tullock contest, over the sharing of some given resource, between two ethnic groups. The resource is allocated by a composite state institution according to relative ethnic control; hence the ethnic groups contest the extent of institutional ethnic bias. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289899

Management impact in an experimental intergroup contest : conference paper

Eisenkopf, Gerald - 2013 - Preliminary draft

The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340540