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Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Games and economic behavior 104 (2017), pp. 744-759

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793488

Political correctness

Morris, Stephen - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001427727

Political correctness

Morris, Stephen - In: Journal of political economy 109 (2001) 2, pp. 231-265

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001570605

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001426812

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001411783

Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Journal of economic theory 102 (2002) 1, pp. 189-228

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001661309

Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners

Bhaskar, V. (contributor); Mailath, George J. (contributor); … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002040512

Purification in the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001966045

Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring

Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002228408

Political Correctness

Morris, Stephen - 2001

An informed advisor wishes to convey her valuable information to an uninformed decision maker with identical preferences. Thus she has a current incentive to truthfully reveal her information. But if the decision maker thinks that the advisor might be biased in favor of one decision and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014134279