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We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049786
We consider a dynamic version of sender–receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662408
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243692
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient. Under these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380794
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489478
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123506
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895645
This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg et al. (1994),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049759
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), Kandori and Matsushima...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645613
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001728694