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Career concerns with exponential learning

Bonatti, Alessandro; Hörner, Johannes - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 425-475

This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704848

Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks

Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351

Career Concerns with Coarse Information

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker's skill is revealed through output, wage is based on expected output, and so on assessed ability. Specifically, effort increases the probability that a skilled worker achieves a one-time breakthrough. Effort levels at different times are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352220

Career Concerns and Market Structure

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895652

Audit contracts and reputation

Portilla, Yolanda - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2009

management and the audit effort are decreasing over time because the incentives to build a reputation also decline for both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196631

Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599552

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical Economics (2014)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010798203

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276

Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442390