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The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some behaviours or signals to modify employers' beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279397
The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some behaviours or signals to modify employers’ beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008017
The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some behaviours or signals to modify employers’ beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205744
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008696428
The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some behaviours or signals to modify employers' beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810982
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061932
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126688
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126728
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001445602
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000994686