We consider how facilitating consumer's ability to compare firms' past performace with that of their competitors affects firms' incentives to invest in quality of experience goods. We show that, counterintuitively, when consumers are better informed and investment in quality is noisy, firms may...

A model of gradual reputation formation through a process of continuous investment in product quality is developed. We assume that the ability to produce high-quality products requires continuous investment and that as a consequence of informational frictions, such as search costs, information...

"We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series of implications and empirically test their validity. Our theoretical model features both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when a seller receives a negative rating for the first time his...

We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series of implications and empirically test their validity. Our theoretical model features both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when a seller receives a negative rating for the first time his...