We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning...

We experimentally investigate a ?nitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner’s contribution. At the...

Using a repeated public good game with stranger matching, we compare how two different reputation systems with endogenous evaluations affect rates of cooperation. Contributions are public information and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of each period,...

We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning...

Online interactions are frequently governed by reputation systems that allow users to evaluate each other after an interaction. Effective reputation systems can increase trust and may improve efficiency in market settings. In recent years, however, fake reviews have become increasingly...

Online interactions are frequently governed by reputation systems that allow users to evaluate each other after an interaction. Effective reputation systems can increase trust and may improve efficiency in market settings. In recent years, however, fake reviews have become increasingly...