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equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not … payoffs. Then, classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673067
We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795331
Credit-rating agencies have an incentive to maintain a public reputation for credibility among investors but also have … an incentive to develop a second, private reputation for leniency among issuers. We show that in markets with few issuers … form a “double reputation.” The model extends the existing literature on “cheap-talk” reputation to the case of two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036167
the equilibrium payoff of the long-lived player (demonstrating ex ante reputation effects) and to show that this lower … bound is asymptotically irrelevant under imperfect monitoring (demonstrating the impermanence of reputation effects). The … chapter continues by examining the (necessarily weaker) reputation results that can be established for the case of two long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025455
To analyze strategic interactions arising in the cyber-security context, we develop a new reputation game model in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013297152
We introduce a class of two-player dynamic games to study the effectiveness of screening in a principal-agent problem. In every period, the principal chooses either to irreversibly stop the game or to continue, and the agent chooses an action if the principal chooses to continue. The agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832336