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Tipping the scales : conciliation, appeal and the relevance of judicial ambition

Christmann, Robin - 2013

Judges become ambitious decision makers when they face appellate review. This paper applies a contract theoretic … implemented court accuracy and degrade the contract outcome. Our implications put into perspective the traditional function of … contract output. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010232650

One-sided contracts in competitive consumer markets

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Posner, Richard A. - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003265277

Contractual completeness : a comparison of two heterogeneous emerging markets

Chao, Emmanuel - In: Journal of global marketing 27 (2014) 2, pp. 106-127

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380437

Contractual satisfaction : drivers and implication for theory

Chao, Emmanuel - In: International journal of economics and business research 7 (2014) 3, pp. 257-274

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010408913

Social capital and contract duration in buyer-supplier networks for information technology outsourcing

Ravindran, Kiron; Susarla, Anjana; Mani, Deepa; … - In: Information systems research : ISR 26 (2015) 2, pp. 379-397

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296084

Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011717468

Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079

Relational contracts : reputation and renegotiation

Pearce, David G.; Staccetti, Ennio - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 179 (2023) 3/4, pp. 562-578

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487038

Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts

MacLeod, William Bentley (contributor) - 2006

increasing the quality of law. -- contract ; law and economics ; reputation ; repeated games ; incomplete contracts … incomplete contract. It is shown that the efficiency of these solutions is very sensitive to the characteristics of the good or … ; transactions costs ; institutional economics ; contract enforcement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003278957

Evolutionary Norm Enforcement

Güth, Werner; Ockenfels, Axel - 2021

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321120