The authors examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties-producers and consumers-interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. They compare an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by...

We use a lab-in-the-field experiment to examine the effectiveness of accountability systems that rely on patient reporting in Kenyan health clinics. We recruit patients and health care providers from public and private health clinics to play a series of modified Trust Games. In the game,...

We use a lab-in-the-field experiment to examine the effectiveness of accountability systems that rely on patient reporting in Kenyan health clinics. We recruit patients and health care providers from public and private health clinics to play a series of modified Trust Games. In the game,...

The authors examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties - producers and consumers - interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. They compare an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is...

We examine how formal and informal contract enforcing institutions interact in a competitive market with asymmetric information where consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Firm level incentives for producing high quality can be achieved with an informal enforcement mechanism,...