Advances in biomedical technology have irrevocably jarred open the black box of human decision making, offering social scientists the potential to validate, reject, refine and redefine the individual models of resource allocation that form the foundation of modern economics. In this paper we (1)...

A uniform bid design from a predetermined uniform distribution is proposed as a practical and robust alternative to existing optimal or naïve bid designs. Analytics and simulations show that the uniform design provides efficiency better than naïve designs under ideal conditions and outperforms...

We challenge the assumption of i.i.d random utility across alternatives embedded in typical applications of logit models to dichotomous choice contingent valuation data. Using a Gumbel mixed distribution which nests a number of traditional models, we show that the logistic distribution is not a...

This essay develops a new method to diagnose inconsistency in dichotomous choice contingent valuation with follow-up questions: in particular, downward bias in the mean WTP. It is shown that the previous methods aimed to explain this inconsistency in responses have ignored statistical...

The sensitivity of WTP is tested in terms of the present value and the implied discount rates are derived by varying the length of benefit and the temporal payment schedules. Results show that holding the length of the project constant, the present value of willingness to pay does not vary...

Experimental economics is used to compare tournaments (T) and fixed performance contracts (F) when agents have heterogeneous costs. Our primary findings were: (1) There is no statistical difference in average pooled effort (effort by high ability and low ability subjects are pooled together to...

Two well-known hypotheses from the literature on tournaments are that (1) tournaments can filter out common shocks thereby reducing agents’ risk exposure; and (2) disincentive effects can arise when a tournament scheme is administered on a group of mixed ability agents. While handicapping and/or...

Experimental economics is used to compare tournaments (T) and fixed performance contracts (F) when agents have heterogeneous costs. Our primary findings were: (1) There is no statistical difference in average pooled effort (effort by high ability and low ability subjects are pooled together to...

Two well-known hypotheses from the literature on tournaments are that (1) tournaments can filter out common shocks thereby reducing agents risk exposure; and (2) disincentive effects can arise when a tournament scheme is administered on a group of mixed ability agents. While handicapping and/or...