This paper undertakes a critical review of the prospect that self-learning pricing algorithms will lead to widespread collusion independently of the intervention and participation of humans. There is no concrete evidence, no example yet, and no antitrust case that self-learning pricing...

This paper examines the law, practice and evidence on fines for price-fixing under European competition law. It undertakes the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of fines imposed on cartels by the European Commission. Based on an analysis of 30 fully reported cartel decisions, and appeals...

This chapter sets out the principles and emerging practice governing cartel damages in the EU and UK. It identifies the types of damages available; the issue surrounding causation, pass-on, volume effects, and mitigation; and the methods that have been be used to estimate overcharges, volume...

This paper sets out the basic economics of cartel formation and stability, the methods of estimating overcharges and quot;but forquot; prices, and concludes with a brief discussion of multiple damages. It draws on some evidence of cartel prosecution in Europe

Some legal academics have claimed that ‘machine collusion’ – tacit collusion generated by self-learning pricing algorithms without human involvement - is a real threat that will go uncheck by current antitrust. Half a decade after these claims received wide publicity the only evidence are...

Friedrich A. von Hayek’s (1899-1992) view of competition as a discovery process is well known but little used. His central thesis is that a competitive pricing system is the most effective way to coordinate economic activity and economise on the information held by market participants in a...