We characterize equilibria of a multistage game in which competing duopolists may acquire and share information in advance of choosing their financial structure which, in turn, precedes production. Given sufficient uncertainty, equilibria exist in which the efficiency and, possibly, coordination...

This note extends earlier work on the effects of risk aversion on the preferences of duopolists to share information. It is shown that the common finding that Cournot duopolists prefer to share firm-specific information no longer obtains for some parameterizations. In particular, the greater the...

This paper empirically tests the impact of CEO’s alumni relationships on the stock price crash risk during CEO turnover. Empirical tests find that CEOs’ advantage among alumni networks will increase stock price crash risk during CEO turnover to some degree. However, this effect is built on...

This paper theoretically studies and empirically estimates (1) how spousal labor supply affects bargaining between the husband and wife over their private consumption, and (2) the impact of this intrahousehold bargaining on their reservation wage and unemployment duration. We consider a model of...

Motivated by the EU Solvency II Directive, we study the one-year ruin probability of an insurer who makes investments and hence faces both insurance and financial risks. Over a time horizon of one year, the insurance risk is quantified as a nonnegative random variable X equal to the aggregate...