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A Note on the Ultimatum Paradox, Bounded Rationality, and Uncertainty

Webster, Thomas Joseph - 2019

The ultimatum game is a sequential-move bargaining game in which a “giver” offers a “taker” a share of a monetary pie. The predicted subgame perfect equilibrium is for rational givers to offer the smallest possible share, and for rational takers to accept. Experimental trials conducted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905908

Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with ISHARA Utility Functions

Li, Sanxi; Yan, Jianye; Sun, Hailin - 2012

We apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility functions to analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary conditions under which an increase in one's degree of risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170653

Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification

Townsend, Robert M. - 1979

its owner unless a verification cost is borne. Contracts in such a setting are said to be consistent if agents submit to … verification and honor claims in accordance with prior agreements. The Pareto optimal consistent contracts which emerge are shown …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000703246

Supply chain coordination by risk sharing contracts under random production yield and deterministic demand

Inderfurth, Karl; Clemens, Josephine - In: OR spectrum : quantitative approaches in management 36 (2014) 2, pp. 525-556

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010253860

Improving logistics outsourcing performance through transactional and relational mechanisms under transaction uncertainties : evidence from China

Yang, Qian; Zhao, Xiande; Yeung, Hoi Yan Jeff; Liu, Yanping - In: International journal of production economics 175 (2016), pp. 12-23

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011477450

Contracts and uncertainty

Olszewski, Wojciech; Sandroni, Alvaro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 1, pp. 1-13

A decision maker, named Alice, wants to know if an expert has significant information about payoff … mitigated by screening contracts that separate informed from uninformed experts. This result stands in contrast with the … analysis of contracts under risk, where separation is often feasible. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702645