This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk-aversion. An increase in risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance (UI) has the reverse effect due to market generated moral hazard: insured workers seek high wage jobs with...

This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk aversion. An increase in risk aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance has the opposite effect: insured workers seek high-wage jobs with high unemployment risk. An economy with...

This paper offers a theory of development that links the degree of market incompleteness to capital accumulation and growth. At early stages of development, the presence of indivisible projects limits the degree of risk spreading (diversification) that the economy can achieve. The desire to...

We provide a framework to study the formation of financial networks and investigate the interplay between banks' lending incentives and the emergence of systemic risk. We show that under natural contracting assumptions, banks fail to internalize the implications of their lending decisions for...

We model policy reform as a way to affect the stochastic process of relative returns that firms face when switching from old to new activities. This stochastic process has an Ito process component that is noncontrollable and policy reforms result in jumps in relative returns that arrive...

This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk-aversion. An increase in risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance (UI) has the reverse effect due to market generated moral hazard: insured workers seek high wage jobs with...