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We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...
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We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599258
We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073423
We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz [1977]) where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains patterns of observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014374649
We use the tools of mechanism design, combined with the theory of risk measures, to analyze how a cash constrained owner of an asset with known stochastic returns raises capital from a population of investors that differ in their risk aversion and budget constraints. The issuer partitions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014578314
We derive the revenue maximizing mechanism for a risk-neutral seller whofaces Yaari's [1987] dual risk-averse bidders. The optimal mechanism offers "full-insurance" in the sense that each agent's utility is independent of other agents'reports. The seller excludes less types than under risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840345
We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance problem under adverse selection where we allow for a random distribution of losses, possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our main purpose is to provide a convenient analytic model that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403505