In a repeated unobserved endowment economy in which agents negotiate long-term contracts with a financial intermediary, we study the implications of the interaction between incentive compatibility and participation constraints for risk sharing. In particular, we assume that after a default...

Long-term minimum return guarantees sold by European life insurers increasingly become binding as interest rates decline. While participating contracts embedding these guarantees are designed to share market risk across investor cohorts when guarantees are not binding, we study how binding...

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent...

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent...

Contracts should be matched to the unique situation of a Major Industrial Plant Project (MIPP). However, in reality, oftentimes contract forms are chosen that do not fit participant's (owners', contractors') competences and risk capabilities. In this paper, MIPP order contract forms are...

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent...