We report a controlled laboratory experiment examining risk-taking and information aggregation in groups facing a common risk. The experiment allows us to examine how subjects respond to new information, in the form of both privately observed signals and signals reported from others. We find...

We report an experiment examining risk taking and information aggregation in groups. Group members come to the table with an individual preference for a choice under risk, based on privately received information, and can share this information with fellow group members. They then make a decision...

This paper investigates the role that idiosyncratic uncertainty plays in shaping social preferences over the degree of labor market flexibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand where the productivity of firms evolves over time as a Geometric Brownian motion. A key result...

This paper investigates the role that idiosyncratic uncertainty plays in shaping social preferences over the degree of labor market flexibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand where the productivity of firms evolves over time as a Geometric Brownian motion. A key result...

We test whether deviations from Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking contests can be explained by the slow convergence of payoff-based learning. We identify and eliminate two sources of noise that slow down learning. The first source of noise is present because each action is evaluated against a...

In the original framework of Professors Acemoglu and Robinson, the government is unable to oppress the revolution once it is brought about. However, actual civil wars are unpredictable. With this notion, I introduce uncertainty depending on military expenditures of the government. Then an...

We study a vote buying setup where a committee votes on a proposal important to the vote buyer. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal's passing in different voting environments. We find that for both simultaneous and sequential votes, the vote buyer...

We run a laboratory experiment with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes in this game...

We study the design of public information structures that maximize the probability of selecting a Pareto dominant equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat the designer as able to implement an equilibrium only...

In this paper, we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple two person fishery management game. Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered. Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic framework has no implications for the...