We study a generalization of the static model of Kyle with two risk neutral insiders to the case where each insider is partially informed about the value of the stock. First, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the linear Bayesian equilibrium. Specifically, we...

We study investment and consumption decisions in a dynamic game under learning. To that end, we present a model in which agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock. At the same time, the agents learn about the stochastic process...

We introduce learning in a Brock-Mirman environment and study the effect of risk generated by the planner's econometric activity on optimal consumption and investment. Here, learning introduces two sources of risk about future payoffs: structural uncertainty and uncertainty from the anticipation...

We consider the original Arrow-Lind framework in which a government undertakes a risky project to be shared among many taxpayers. In our model, the taxpayers decide the level of participation in the risky project. Moreover, the amount of taxes collected by the government fully finances the...

We consider the original Arrow-Lind framework in which a government undertakes a risky project to be shared among many taxpayers. In our model, the taxpayers decide the level of participation in the risky project. Moreover, the amount of taxes collected by the government fully finances the...