This paper considers a market in which only the incumbent's quality is publicly known. The entrant's quality is observed by the incumbent and some fraction of informed consumers. This leads to price signalling rivalry between the duopolists, because the incumbent gains and the entrant loses when...

I present the idea that imperfect information about the (vertical) quality characteristics of goods reduces the sellers' incentives for horizontal product differentiation. As a result, the equilibrium outcome may be characterized by "minimum differentiation." In a spatial framework this implies...

Both consumers and a monopolist producer are uncertain about a good's quality. I derive conditions under which the value of public information about quality will be positive or negative to consumers and the firm. I find that the firm always prefers more information, but consumers may not. I...

This paper focuses on risk information campaigns familiarizing consumers with hazardous product attributes and compares policies advocating voluntary and mandatory displays of warning messages. The food allergen labeling campaign provides an opportunity to focus on the availability and...

We analyze a model in which firms are able to acquire information about product risks and may or may not be required to disclose this information. We initially study the effect of disclosure rules assuming that firms are not liable for the harm caused by their products. Although mandatory...

Since several years, the fragility of global supply chains (GSCs) is at historically high levels. In the same time, the landscape of hybrid threats is expanding. This paper aims to assess the economies' foreign input reliance and foreign market reliance, identify possible vulnerabilities by...