Principal-agent problems can reduce gains from exchange available in long distance trade. One solution to mitigate this problem is multilateral punishment, whereby groups of principals jointly punish cheating agents by giving them bad reputations. But how does such punishment work when there is...

This study examines risk premia in a laboratory market featuring a long-lived asset. The research is enabled by prevention of the persistent bubbles and crashes endemic to laboratory markets utilizing long-lived assets. Positive, statistically significant risk premia are reported, in support of...

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...

We study an observable risk-return tradeoff for which risk "preferences" are normatively prescribed by the desire to win the game. The choice is whether to shoot a 2-pointer or a 3-pointer in professional (NBA) basketball. When trailing, teams should get more risk-loving as they fall further...

I experimentally examine whether feedback about others' choices provides an anchor for decision-making under ambiguity. In a between-subjects design I vary whether subjects learn choices made individually by a "peer" in a first part when facing the same task a second time, and whether prospects...