We study a dynamic contracting problem in which size is relevant. The agent may take on excessive risk to enhance short-term gains, which exposes the principal to large, infrequent losses. To preserve incentive compatibility, the optimal contract uses size as an instrument; there is downsizing...

We study a continuous time contracting problem with risk taking in which size plays a role. The agent may take on excessive risk to enhance short-term gains; doing so exposes the principal to large, infrequent (poisson) losses. The optimal contract must use size as an instrument; there is...

The supply of allowances in the European Union Emissions Trading System is currently determined by a rigid allocation programme. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) makes the allocation of allowances flexible and contingent on the aggregate bank, while preserving the overall emissions cap. We...

This papers investigates the change in risk transmission mechanism between commodities as a result of the financialization of the commodity market. Relying on intra-day price observations for 25 commodities traded in the US market, the time series of realized variances/covariances is...

The substantial economic transformation required to mitigate and adapt to climate change will lower the value of certain businesses as well as some firms' assets in the not-too-distant future. Firms will need to transition to a less carbon-intensive business model, but may do so at different...

Using Credit Default Swap spreads, we construct a forward-looking, market-implied carbon risk factor and show that carbon risk affects firms' credit spread. The effect is larger for European than North American firms and varies substantially across industries, suggesting the market recognises...