Eight centuries ago, Thomas Aquinas clearly differentiated between probability and uncertainty in decision making. He viewed probability eclectically as having elements that involved propositions about events, frequency of events, and single events. He found an important role in his approach for...

The Townshend–Keynes exchanges over decision making, weight of the argument (evidence), non numerical probabilities (Keynes’s term for Boole’s constituent probabilities, used in The Laws of Thought in 1854, that appears on page 163 of the A Treatise on Probability in chapter 15 on inexact...

Adam Smith was the first academic in history to make an explicit, detailed Uncertainty – Risk distinction and apply it clearly in a number of worked out examples and applications consistently in his analysis of decision making in the Wealth of Nations on occupational choice, businesses such as...

It is a straight forward exercise to demonstrate that the concept of the weight of the evidence in the A Treatise on Probability and the concept of uncertainty in the General Theory both follow directly from Keynes's analysis and application of Boole's development of the concept of upper and...

Alan Greenspan's approach to dealing with the problem of uncertainty, as opposed to risk, appears to be extremely close to the approach advocated by J.M. Keynes himself in both the A Treatise on Probability (1921) and General Theory (1936). Greenspan provides an improved, general definition of...