In many situations, agents take risks by choosing an action that increases their performance immediately, but that potentially leads to a large loss. The current paper studies how such risk-taking behavior depends on the level of competition that the agents face. We study a tournament model and...

We develop a general framework for studying contests, including the well-known models of Tullock (1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases. The contest outcome depends on players' efforts and skills, the latter being subject to symmetric uncertainty. The model is tractable, because...

In many situations, agents take risks by choosing an action that increases their performance immediately, but that potentially leads to a large loss. The current paper studies how such risk-taking behavior depends on the level of competition that the agents face. We study a tournament model and...

In many situations, agents take risks by choosing an action that increases their performance immediately, but that potentially leads to a large loss. The current paper studies how such risk-taking behavior depends on the level of competition that the agents face. We study a tournament model and...

According to the new capital adequacy framework (Basel II) finally adopted by the Basel Committee in June 2004 the eligibility of collaterals, especially financial collaterals, is extended in comparison to the existing rules. However, financial assets are valued conservatively in the credit...

The ongoing debate concerning credit concentration risk is mainly driven by the requirements on credit risk management due to Pillar 2 of Basel II since risks (e.g. concentration risk) that are not fully captured by Pillar 1 should be adequately considered in the banks' risk management. This...