We examine how executives' ability to control their firm's exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. Using the introduction of exchanged-traded weather derivatives as a natural experiment, we find that executives who became more able to control their firm's...

We examine the association between I/B/E/S's disclosure of non-GAAP earnings and investor uncertainty around earnings announcements. On one hand, investor uncertainty may decrease with I/B/E/S's non-GAAP disclosure because these disclosures make investors aware of alternative performance...

We examine whether management guidance contains complementary information that helps resolve investor uncertainty around macroeconomic announcements. We find that when firms issue a management earnings forecast in the month prior to a Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement of the...

We examine how firms' contractual relationships with their employees affect the design of their debt contracts, and their use of financial covenants and pricing grids in particular. Viewing the firm as nexus of both explicit and implicit contractual relationships, we argue that managers...