We develop a dynamic model of banking to assess the effects of liquidity and leverage requirements on banks' insolvency risk. In this model, banks face taxation, flotation costs of securities, and default costs and maximize shareholder value by making their financing, liquid asset holdings, and...

We challenge the view that short-term debt curbs moral hazard and analytically demonstrate that, in a world with financing frictions and fair debt pricing, short-term debt increases incentives for risk-taking. To do so, we develop a model in which firms are financed with equity and short-term...

The real options framework has been used extensively to analyze the timing of investment under uncertainty. While standard real options models assume that agents possess a constant rate of time preference, there is substantial evidence that agents are very impatient about choices in the...

Many economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping problem under uncertainty. Motivated by experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox, we follow Knight (1921) and distinguish risk from uncertainty. To afford this distinction, we adopt the multiple-priors...

We develop a model of investment under uncertainty for a nancially constrained firm. Facing external financing costs, the firm prefers to fund its investment through internal funds, so that the firm's optimal investment policy and value now depend on both its earnings fundamentals and liquidity...