We document the impact of having a risk committee (RC) and a chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk using the passage of the Dodd Frank Act as a natural experiment. The Act requires bank holding companies with over $10B of assets to have an RC to oversee risk management, while those with over...

Our goal is to document the causal impact of having a board-level risk committee (RC) and a management-level executive designated as chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk. The Dodd Frank Act requires bank holding companies with over $10 billion of assets to have an RC, while those with over $50...

We document the impact of having a risk committee (RC) and a chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk using the passage of the Dodd Frank Act as a natural experiment. The Act requires bank holding companies with over $10B of assets to have an RC to oversee risk management, while those with over...

We model and empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs. The measures we develop for the tournament prize derive from the compensation gap between the CEO at her firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar competing firms. The model predicts that firm performance and risk...

This paper builds on Rosen (1981) and Hvide (2002) to provide a simple framework that elucidates the nature of incentives in the tournaments among top executives in both the external managerial labor market for the top executive positions in other companies and within the executives' own firm...