We study the optimal insurance demand in the μ,σ space when the decision-maker faces a first-order risk increase. In particular, we investigate the effect of an increase in the expected damage when the variance is held constant. An unambiguous result is derived on insurance demand that differs...

We consider the original Arrow-Lind framework in which a government undertakes a risky project to be shared among many taxpayers. In our model, the taxpayers decide the level of participation in the risky project. Moreover, the amount of taxes collected by the government fully finances the...

A stochastic solution is proposed for a general problem of demand for risks with both value-maximizing firms and risk averse agents. Explicit solutions are possible for both models when the interesting risk is perceived to be fairly-priced by the two decision makers

The term “equity premium puzzle” was coined in 1985 by economists Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott. The equity premium puzzle in considered one of the most significant questions in finance. A number of papers have explored the fundamental questions of why the premium exists and has not...

Models of rational lottery play assume that lottery winners are risk-seekers. Models of skewness preference are not an exception to this. Skewness preference is not, in general, sufficient to make risk-averse individuals play, if one does not assume a risk-seeking attitude at windfall gains. In...

We consider the original Arrow-Lind framework in which a government undertakes a risky project to be shared among many taxpayers. In our model, the taxpayers decide the level of participation in the risky project. Moreover, the amount of taxes collected by the government fully finances the...

This paper focuses on the attitude of non-professional investors towards financial losses and their decisions on wealth allocation, and how these change subject to behavioral factors. Our contribution concerns the integration of behavioral elements into the classic portfolio optimization....

We consider the original Arrow-Lind framework in which a government undertakes a risky project to be shared among many taxpayers. In our model, the taxpayers decide the level of participation in the risky project. Moreover, the amount of taxes collected by the government fully finances the...

Expected utility functions are limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, while non-expected utility functions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aversion. We extend the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of conditional dependent...